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Abstract
When a spot market monopolist participates in the futures market, he has an incentive to adjust spot
prices to make his futures market position more protable. Rational futures market makers take this into
account when they set prices. Spot market power thus creates a moral hazard problem which parallels
the adverse selection problem in models with inside information. This moral hazard not only reduces the
optimal amount of hedging for those with and without market power, but also makes complete hedging
impossible. When market makers cannot distinguish orders placed by those with and without market
power, market power provides a venue for strategic trading and market manipulation. The monopolist
will strategically randomize his futures market position and then use his market power to make this
position protable. Furthermore, traders without market power can manipulate futures prices by hiding
their orders behind the monopolists strategic trades.
1 Introduction
For many goods, spot markets with market power coexist with competitive futures markets. When a spot
market monopolist participates in a futures market, this participation leads to a moral hazard problem in the
spot market. In particular, he has an incentive to deviate from the monopoly optimum in order to make his
futures market position more protable. For example, if a monopolist producer of oil holds a short position
in an oil futures contract, he will prot if the price of oil goes down. This gives him an incentive to produce
more oil than he otherwise might in order to reduce spot market prices and make his futures position more
protable. When rational futures market participants observe the monopolists position, they will take it
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into account when setting futures prices. When they cannot observe the monopolists position perfectly,
they take his possible presence into account when setting prices.
In this paper, we explore the impact of goods market power on nancial market participation, both for
those with and without market power. We examine three rationales of trading in a futures market: hedging,
strategic trading, and manipulation. We show that spot market power reduces the incentive of all agents
to participate in futures markets to hedge risks. However, spot market power provides the monopolist with
an incentive to trade strategically randomly taking a position in the futures market and then moving spot
prices to make that position protable. This allows the possibility that those without market power may
engage in futures market manipulation taking a position in a derivatives market and then mimicking the
monopolists futures trading to move futures market prices to make the derivatives position protable.
The literature on market microstructure deals extensively with the e¤ects of adverse selection when some
agents have inside information. This paper will argue that the moral hazard created by spot market power
will have parallel e¤ects. As with inside information, market power deters nancial market participation by
those with hedging motives but provides a venue for strategic trading and market manipulation.
Section 2 relates to the hedging motive of the monopolist. We show that hedging is expensive for those
with monopoly power. Monopolists may have an incentive to participate in futures market to avoid the
cost of nancial distress or agency problems, or because an entire economy may depend on the protability
of the monopolist. If the monopolist reduces risk by selling future production forward or buying a futures
contract, he now has an incentive to increase production in the future. When he sells future production
forward, he has an incentive to increase production since doing so does not reduce the price of previously
sold units. When he buys a futures contract which pays o¤ when prices are low, he has an incentive to
increase production to make the futures contract more protable. Taking this into account, futures or
forward market participants will rationally set prices that are unfavorable to the monopolist. In e¤ect,
futures markets provide a venue for competition of the monopolist with his future self. Section 2 recasts
the durable goods monopoly problem of Coase (1972) in terms of futures markets instead of durability.
Anderson and Sundaresan (1984) studied a similar question to the one considered in Section 2 by focusing
on whether futures trading can exist in a rational expectations equilibrium under spot market power. We
obtain a result equivalent to theirs: a risk-neutral monopolist does not participate in the futures market
whereas a risk-averse monopolist participates in the futures market and his participation is increasing in the
degree of risk aversion. While some of the results of Anderson and Sundaresan are based on second-order
approximations and on futures contracts, we are able to prove these results more generally and for general
derivatives contracts. A novel insight in this section is that it is impossible to completely eliminate all risk.
This holds for any degree of risk aversion and for any price-contingent derivatives contract. In addition, we
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show that large amounts of hedging are state-wise dominated. Just as no tradetheorems (Milgrom and
Stokey (1982)) show that there is no price at which informed agents can trade in nancial markets, we prove
a no complete hedgingtheorem that shows that there is no price at which agents with spot market power
can eliminate all spot market price risk.
Anderson (1990) surveys the literature on futures trading when the underlying market is imperfectly
competitive and suggests in his conclusion:
The theoretical development that would be most interesting would be to reconsider some
of these models described above under conditions of asymmetric information. In particular, the
models reviewed have made the assumption (at least implicitly) that the futures positions of
powerful agents are observed so that forecasts of future cash prices can take this into account.
In practice, futures positions of agents are likely to be imperfectly observable.(p. 246-247)
In Sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we follow exactly that route and explore strategic trading and manip-
ulation in futures markets when market positions cannot be perfectly inferred. In Section 3, we show that
the monopolist is able to strategically exploit his spot market power. If the spot market monopolist is able
to hide within the futures market aggregate order ow, he will randomly participate in the futures market
and then set spot prices to make his futures market position more protable. This makes hedging more
expensive for those who may be the monopolists counterparty. Spot market power thus discourages futures
market participation for agents without market power and provides a venue for a spot market monopolist
to increase prots by trading strategically.
This section shows that results similar to Kyles (1985) noise tradermodel are obtained when there
is spot market power instead of inside information. In our model, there are no informed traders who have
private information about future prices at the time of trading. However, after taking a position in the
futures market, the monopolist has the market power to set spot market prices, thereby making his futures
market position more protable. Market power thus creates a moral hazard problem in our model, whereas
private information leads to an adverse selection problem in the Kyle model. Note that the monopolist is
only able to exploit his position strategically if it cannot be inferred perfectly from the aggregate order ow.
In our model, agents without market power respond optimally to the monopolists futures market presence
by reducing their futures market participation (see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) for the analogous
extension of the Kyle model).
Sections 2 and 3 integrate the durable goods monopoly problem of Coase from the industrial organization
literature and the noise tradermodel of Kyle from the market microstructure literature to show that spot
market power discourages futures market participation for participants with and without market power.
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In Section 4, we show that traders are able to move (i.e. manipulate) futures prices even when they
do not have market power. If a futures market manipulator without market power takes a position in the
derivatives market, he has an incentive to trade and thereby move future underlying prices to make his initial
position protable. He will be successful in moving prices if the market believes that his subsequent trades
could have been submitted by the monopolist. While these subsequent trades are unprotable, this cost is
outweighed by benet of moving prices to make the initial position more protable.
Section 4 relates to the literature on manipulation in capital markets (e.g. Hart (1977), Jarrow (1992),
Allen and Gale (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992)). Compared with this literature, the novelty of our model
is that it does not require that agents have private information about prices; instead, we show that market
power serves a similar function. For example, Kumar and Seppi develop a model in which uninformed
manipulators are able to prot in the futures market by manipulating spot market prices. While they
have no inside information, they are able to move spot prices because spot market makers are unable to
di¤erentiate the uniformed manipulators order ow from the informed traders order ow. This model
requires the potential presence of informed traders, while our model relies on the presence of traders with
market power to serve the same function.
In summary, spot market power reduces agentsincentive to participate in futures markets. For those
with market power, hedging is expensive because its price takes into account the impact of the futures market
position on spot market prices. For those without market power, the presence of market power makes futures
market participation more expensive by introducing the possibility of strategic trading or manipulation. As
a result, we would predict that futures markets with underlying monopoly spot markets would be relatively
small and illiquid when compared to the spot market.1
2 Hedging by Spot Market Monopolists
In this section, we consider the impact of spot market power on a monopolists ability to hedge spot market
price risk. If a spot market monopolist is risk-averse, he has an incentive to hedge against uctuations
in prots. In a world with demand shocks - when high prots coincide with high prices - the payo¤ of
a hedging contract will be negatively related to the underlying spot market price. Entering into such a
contract ex-ante creates moral hazard. The monopolist has an incentive to increase production, thereby
reducing spot market prices to make the hedging contract more protable. This moral hazard problem
increases the cost of the hedging contract and reduces monopoly power. The monopolist faces a trade-o¤
1Our model excludes the possibility that the good may be stored. Over time horizons short enough that storage is cost-
e¤ective, substantial futures markets may exist as storage will limit the monopolists power to move prices. Of course, storage
will also erode monopoly power.
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between hedging risk and maintaining monopoly prots. This section will show that this e¤ect reduces the
optimal quantity of hedging; a risk-neutral monopolist will not want to hedge risk in the nancial markets,
while a risk-averse one will hedge less than he would if he had no market power. We will show that as the
degree of risk-aversion increases, the optimal amount of hedging will increase. Relative to other research
(e.g. Anderson and Sundaresan (1984)), this section is innovative because it shows that complete hedging is
impossible and large amounts of hedging can be state-wise dominated.
The impact of futures market in reducing the amount of monopoly power can be interpreted in light of the
durable goods monopoly of Coase (1972). In a Coasian setting, the durability of the good provides a venue
for the monopolist e¤ectively to compete with his future self. The monopolist has an incentive to produce
sooner rather than later if he has a positive discount rate or if consumers prefer to own the good sooner
rather than later. If the monopolist cannot commit not to produce additional units in the next period, his
production of the durable good today competes with his production of the good tomorrow. This reduces
his monopoly power. In our setting, futures markets serve the same role as durability. The monopolist has
an incentive to sell production forward or short a futures contract if he is risk-averse. If he cannot commit
to condition production on realized demand, his participation in the forward market - selling tomorrows
production today - creates competition with his sales in tomorrows spot market.
2.1 Model Setup
We envision a model with one good and two periods, t = 0; 1. A monopolist with utility function u is
the sole producer of the good, and the good is produced only in the last period. The monopolist chooses
quantity, Q, to maximize his prots. Demand is uncertain and realizes in between the two periods. The
demand curve is given by P = f (Q;D) where D is the realization of demand. The cost of production is
normalized to zero. In the initial period, the monopolist can enter into a derivatives contract. The payo¤
of this contract could be any function of the spot price, g (P )   k, where k is the strike price.2 Given a
competitive derivatives market with risk-neutral market makers, the price of the derivatives contract must
be equal to the expected payo¤ of the contract, i.e. k = E [g (P )]. The monopolists prots are then
 = C (g (P )  E [g (P )]) +QP , (1)
2 If the derivatives contract is a linear future, so that g (P ) = P , then this problem is equivalent to one in which the monopolist
could sell t = 1 production forward at t = 0.
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where C is the number of derivatives contract bought by the monopolist in the rst period.3 In the last
period, after demand is realized, the monopolist chooses a quantity, Q, to maximize prots, i.e.
Q = argmax
Q
(C (g (P )  k) +QP ) .
The spot market rst-order condition (FOC) is given by
@
@Q
=
@
@Q
(C (g (f (Q;D))  k) +Qf (Q;D))
= (Cg0 +Q) f1 + f = 0, (2)
where we assume that the second order condition is satised. In the initial period, the monopolist will set
C to satisfy the derivatives market FOC,
@E [u ()]
@C
= E

@
@C
u0 ()

= 0, (3)
where
d
dC
= g   E [g] + C

dQ
dC
f1g
0   E

dQ
dC
f1g
0

+
dQ
dC
f +Q
dQ
dC
f1. (4)
Substituting the spot market FOC (2) into (4) yields:
d
dC
= g   E [g]  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

. (5)
Given that the spot market quantity, Q, is chosen optimally, the derivatives market FOC is found by
substituting (5) into (3):
@E [u ()]
@C
= E

g   E [g]  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

 u0 ()

= 0 (6)
where we can set E [g (P )] = 0 without loss of generality. Market power introduces the E
h
dQ
dC f1g
0
i
term
into this FOC. This has an important impact on the optimal amount of hedging, C. When setting C, the
monopolist takes into account that hedging will induce him to deviate from the spot market optimum, dQdC ,
that this deviation will change spot prices, f1, and that this change in spot prices will change the payo¤ of
the derivatives contract, g0. Importantly, he takes into account that market makers know this when setting
prices.
3 In this section, we assume that C is perfectly observable by all market participants. In sections 3 and 4, we relax this
assumption which gives room for strategic trading and manipulation in the derivatives market.
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In the following subsections, we will examine optimal monopolist behavior for varying degrees of risk
aversion. Risk-neutral monopolists will not want to hedge price risk (Proposition 1). Risk-averse monop-
olists will hedge completely only if derivatives contracts can be conditioned on the realization of demand
(Proposition 2). Otherwise, risk-averse monopolists will hedge some but not all of their risk (Proposition
3). Furthermore, the amount of hedging will be increasing in the degree of risk aversion (Proposition 4).
However, even an innitely risk-averse monopolist will not nd it optimal to eliminate risk completely as
doing so is state-wise dominated (Proposition 5).
2.2 Risk-Neutral Monopolists Dont Hedge
Proposition 1 A risk-neutral monopolist does not participate in the derivatives market, i.e. C = 0, and
sells the monopoly quantity at the monopoly price in the spot market.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The monopolist faces a trade-o¤ between reducing risk and maintaining monopoly prots. A risk-neutral
monopolist does not value risk reduction. It is therefore optimal for him to maintain full monopoly prots
by not participating in the derivatives market. Now we examine the behavior of a risk-averse monopolist.
Risk aversion provides an incentive for the monopolist to reduce risk. If the monopolist can buy a derivatives
contract with a payo¤ contingent on realized demand, all risk can be eliminated without giving up monopoly
prots. However, when demand-contingent derivatives contracts are not feasible, the monopolist will reduce
but not completely eliminate his exposure to risk and will give up some but not all of his monopoly prots.
2.3 Risk-Averse Monopolists with Commitment
Proposition 2 If a derivatives contract can be made contingent on realized demand and if any such contract
can be written, then a risk-averse monopolist will eliminate all risk and maintain full monopoly prots in the
spot market.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
A demand-contingent contract is ideal for the monopolist as it allows him to completely eliminate risk
while maintaining monopoly prots. The optimal demand-contingent contract will pay o¤ most in states
where demand is lowest. These are the states with the lowest equilibrium prices. Since contract payo¤s
are contingent on realized demand and not prices, the monopolist has no incentive to change prices from
the monopoly optimum since doing so has no impact on the derivative contracts payo¤. Note that the
monopolists ability to eliminate all risk while maintaining market power depends critically on the veriability
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of demand on existence of a contractible proxy for risk that the monopolist cannot change. However, in
the real world, demand may not be observable. Even when demand is observable, it is almost certainly not
veriable. One could get around that problem by writing a contract contingent on both price and quantity.
However, if quantity is not veriable, a price-contingent contract may be the only mechanism available for
a monopolist to reduce risk. The next subsection will show that using this mechanism comes at the cost of
reduced market power.4
2.4 Risk Averse Monopolists without Commitment
Buying a derivatives contract allows the monopolist to transfer wealth from high-price states to low-price
states. For such a contract to be useful in reducing risk, spot prices must be correlated with good or bad
states. However, doing so comes at the cost of reduced monopoly prots. In the rest of this section, we
assume for compactness that the monopolist faces demand shocks. Put another way, good states have both
high prices and high prots while bad states have both low prices and low prots.5
Proposition 3 A risk-averse monopolist will participate in the derivatives market and will give up monopoly
prots to do so. If the payo¤ of the derivatives contract is increasing (decreasing) in the spot price, the
monopolist will go short (long), i.e. C < 0 (i.e. C > 0). He will sell a larger total quantity in the spot
market, receive a lower price, and make lower expected prots than if he did not participate in the derivatives
market.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
When the monopolist takes a position in the derivatives market, this gives him an incentive to deviate
from the spot market optimum to make that position more protable. This reduces his expected spot
market prots. If the derivatives market is competitive and if the monopolists derivatives market position
is perfectly observable, then market makers will set prices so that the monopolist earns zero expected prot
in the derivatives market. Using the derivatives market to reduce risk is costly since it reduces expected
spot market prots while expected derivatives market prots are always zero. However, these costs are small
when derivatives market participation is limited. As a result, a risk-averse monopolist will nd it optimal
to use the derivatives market to reduce some but not all risk, and will face reduced expected prots.
4The durable goods monopoly literature considers similar issues. Bulow (1982) shows that a monopolistic producer of a
durable good could avoid the durable goods monopoly problem by leasing the good. Stokey (1981), Gul, Sonnenschein, and
Wilson (1986), and Ausubel and Deneckere, (1989) examine the durable goods monopoly problem in an innite-period setting.
If the monopolist is not able to build up reputation, then the price of the durable good drops to marginal cost. However, by
building up reputation the monopolist may be able to recover part of his monopoly power. Allaz and Vila (1993) show that
the price in a Cournot duopoly without uncertainty but with access to a forward market converges to the competitive price as
the number trading periods increases. In our setting, we consider a two-period model and therefore do not allow for multiple
trading in the futures market.
5Note that this assumption rules out supply shocks where increased prices correspond to lower quantity and lower monopoly
prots. Parallel results obtain when the monopolist faces supply shocks.
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2.4.1 Hedging Increases with Risk Aversion
Not only do risk-averse monopolists participate in the derivatives market, but the degree of futures market
participation increases with the degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 4 The more risk-averse a monopolist is, the more derivatives contracts he will go long (short)
if the payo¤ of the derivatives contract is increasing (decreasing) in the spot price.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The monopolist faces a trade-o¤ between reducing risk and maintaining monopoly prots. As the mo-
nopolist becomes more risk averse, risk reduction becomes relatively more important. Since the cost of
reducing risk the deviation from the spot market monopoly optimum is increasing in the amount of risk
reduction, a more risk-averse monopolist will be willing to reduce risk to a degree that a less risk-averse
monopolist would nd too costly.
2.4.2 Complete Hedging is Impossible
We have shown that the amount of hedging increases with the degree of risk aversion. While one might think
that an innitely risk-averse monopolist would eliminate all risk at any cost, this subsection will document
that doing so is impossible. Complete hedging is impossible even when the monopolist can choose between
any price-contingent derivatives contract. Furthermore, large amounts of hedging are state-wise dominated
and therefore not optimal for any monopolist, regardless of their degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 5 There exists no price-contingent derivatives contract which can eliminate all prot risk.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Any price-contingent contract that eliminates all risk must pay out relatively more when prices indicate
a badstate, exactly o¤setting any reduced spot market prots in these states. As a result, the monopolist
will always have an incentive to set prices as if a bad state had occurred, even in good states. Since
spot market prots are higher in better states holding prices xed and derivatives contract payo¤s must
be the same in all states with the same price, the monopolist will earn higher prots in goodstates. There
is no incentive compatible contract that eliminates all risk. This no complete hedgingtheorem draws an
analog to the no trade theorems of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and others. Just as our theorem shows
that complete hedging is impossible at any price for spot market monopolists, these theorems show that
agents with inside information will be unable to trade at any price.
As a simple illustration of this idea, we consider a linear demand function with a binomial demand
shock. Since there are only two states of the world, a linear futures contract is su¢ cient to span the set of
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price-contingent contracts. Demand is given by
P = a  bQ, (7)
where a takes values aH > aL with probabilities pH and pL = 1   pH respectively. The payo¤ of each
futures contract is g (P ) = P   E [P jC]. Plugging (7) into (1), the monopolists prots are then
 = C (a  bQ  E [a  bQjC]) +Q (a  bQ) . (8)
Evaluating (2) with (7), the spot market FOC is
@
@Q
=  Cb+ a  2bQ = 0,
which implies
Q =
a  bC
2b
; P  =
a+ bC
2
. (9)
Therefore, lifetime prots given optimal spot market production can be found by substituting (9) into (8):
 = C
a
2
  E
ha
2
i
+
a2   b2C2
4b
. (10)
Note, that  aLb < C < a
L
b to obtain positive prices and quantities in both states. A quantity C can be
chosen to maximize prots in a given state of the world. An innitely risk-averse monopolist will maximize
prots in the worst state and thus set
C =  pH a
H   aL
b
.6
An innitely risk-seeking monopolist will maximize prots in the best state and therefore choose
C =
 
1  pH aH   aL
b
,7
while, as shown above, a risk-neutral monopolist sets C = 0. While any C 2

 aLb ; a
L
b

is feasible, any
C =2
h
 pH aH aLb ;
 
1  pH aH aLb i is state-wise dominated. Outside of this range the monopolist can
increase prots in both states of the world by bringing C closer to zero.
6This value is only feasible if
 
1 + pH

aL > pHaH . Otherwise, the monopolist will choose the lowest feasible level,  aL
b
.
7This value is only feasible if
 
1  pH aH <  2  pH aL. Otherwise, the monopolist will choose the highest feasible level,
aL
b
.
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Figure 1 plots prots in the badL-state on the y-axis against prots in the goodH-state on the
x-axis for the case when b = 1, aH = 2, aL = 1, and pH = pL = 0:5. Any point on the 45 line represents the
total elimination of risk. The dashed line represents the wealth levels in the two states if the monopolist can
write state-contingent contracts. The slope of this line is the rate at which he can transfer wealth form the
bad state to the good state; it is constant and equal to   pH
1 pH . When only price-contingent contracts are
possible the rate at which wealth can be transferred depends upon the amount of wealth transferred between
the two states. Put another way, the marginal cost of additional hedging increases with the amount being
hedged; it becomes innite well before all risk is eliminated. This feature is represented by the curved line.
Note that any hedging quantity between  1 and +1 is feasible. However, only hedging quantities between
  12 and 12 are not state-wise dominated. An innitely risk-averse monopolist would thus choose C =   12 , an
innitely risk-seeking monopolist would choose C = 12 , and a risk-neutral monopolist would choose C = 0.
Figure 1
In this section, we documented that a spot market monopolist faces a trade-o¤ between reducing risk
through a futures market and maintaining monopoly prots. Since reducing risk through the futures market
creates a moral hazard problem in the spot market, the monopolist will nd it optimal to hedge only some
of his risk. Furthermore, eliminating all risk is impossible.
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3 Strategic Trading by Spot Market Monopolists
The last section documented that spot market power reduces the ability of a monopolist to hedge price
risk. In this section, we show how spot market monopolists may trade strategically in the futures market
to exploit their market power even when they are risk-neutral. This trade will discourage futures market
participation by others. Agents who want to participate in the futures market fear that the monopolist may
be their counterparty or the counterparty of someone with a similar position in the futures market. The
monopolist will exert spot market power to make his futures position more protable, thereby reducing the
protability of his counterparties.8
This section builds on the work of Kyle (1985) who shows that agents with inside information can prof-
itably exploit their informational advantage by hiding behind the order ow of uninformed noise traders.
In our model, the aggregate hedging demand of agents without market power is stochastic just as the number
of noise traders is stochastic in the Kyle model. Observing only aggregate order ow, market makers
cannot perfectly determine the monopolists futures market position just as market makers cannot observe
the orders placed by informed traders in the Kyle model.
The monopolist can increase his prots because market makers cannot take the impact of the monopolists
futures market position on expected spot prices fully into account when setting futures market prices. While
the monopolists expected spot market prot is reduced by deviating from the monopoly optimum, his
expected prot in the futures market more than makes up for it. Since market makers earn zero expected
prots, the monopolists expected futures market prots imply expected futures market losses for other
market participants. When other agents participate in the futures market, they receive unfavorable prices
since market makers believe that the order ow they generate could have come from the monopolist. This
increased cost deters these agents from hedging price risk as much as they otherwise might.
Unlike the noise traders in the Kyle model who act mechanically, the agents in our model respond
optimally to the presence of the monopolist in the futures market (see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992)
for the analogous extension of the Kyle model). It is also important to note that in our model, unlike in
the Kyle model, there is no private information at the time of trading. In our model, spot market power
serves the role performed by inside information in the Kyle model. In the Kyle model, informed agents hide
behind aggregate order ow to take nancial market positions consistent with their inside information; in
our model, monopolists hide behind aggregate order ow by submitting random nancial market positions
8Storage may reduce the ability of the monopolist to trade strategically. When storage is inexpensive, agents without market
power may purchase and store the good in anticipation of higher prices in the future. This limits the ability of the monopolist
to raise prices, as excess capacity will prevent prices from increasing. In this sense, storage is like durability in Coase (1972)
in that it provides competition for the monopolist. Here, we assume that storage costs are high enough that no storage takes
place in equilibrium and that monopoly power is not eroded.
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and then exert market power to make these positions protable.
3.1 Model Setup
There are three types of agents in this market. Two types of agents are identical to the ones described in
Section 2. First, there is a spot market monopolist. The monopolist controls the spot price by setting the
spot market quantity to maximize prots. Here, we assume that the monopolist is risk-neutral. Because
the monopolist is risk-neutral, he has no incentive to participate in the futures market unless he can increase
expected prots by doing so. Second, the price in the futures market is set by competitive risk-neutral market
makers. These agents observe the aggregate demand for futures contracts and set prices accordingly. In
addition, we introduce risk-averse agents whose payo¤ depends on the price realized in the spot market.
They have an incentive to participate in the futures market because doing so allows them to reduce their
exposure to spot price risk. We assume that the number of these agents is stochastic and unobservable.
The timing of events is as follows. First, nature chooses a number of risk-averse agents. Then the
monopolist and these risk-averse agents simultaneously submit orders to the futures market. Observing the
aggregate order ow, the sum of the order ows submitted by the monopolist and the risk-averse agents,
market makers set the futures price equal to the spot market price they expect. Next, demand is realized
and the monopolist chooses spot market quantity to maximize prots.
We assume a linear demand curve, so that spot prices are given by (7), P = a  bQ, where a is stochastic
and b > 0.9 Again, the cost of production is assumed to be zero. The futures market is characterized by
linear cash-settled contracts with payo¤ P   k per contract. The monopolist chooses a number of contracts
Cm. Given Cm and demand realization, a, the monopolist sets spot market price and quantity to maximize
prots
 = Cm (a  bQ  k) + (a  bQ)Q. (11)
The spot market FOC is
@
@Q
=  bCm + a  2bQ = 0.
Note that the SOC is satised, yielding an optimal quantity and price
Q =
1
2b
(a  bCm) (12)
P  =
1
2
(a+ bCm) .
9The choice of a linear demand function is for analytic tractability. While a much broader class of functions will obtain
similar results, not all demand functions will obtain the same results. In particular, convex demand curves will provide an
even stronger incentive for the monopolist to strategically trade in the futures market as large changes in the spot price lead to
relatively small changes in monopoly prots. Concave demand curves provide a weaker incentive for strategic trading.
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We assume that all risk-averse agents are identical and that the number of such agents, N , is stochastic
and uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Each agent chooses a number of contracts Cn. This number will be
determined optimally based on their preferences. The total number of contracts submitted by these agents,
NCn, is therefore stochastic. Market makers only observe the aggregate order ow, NCn + Cm. They
have beliefs about the order ow submitted by the monopolist and the risk-averse agents and set the futures
price, k, accordingly.
In this setup, we look for equilibria in the futures market given optimal subsequent behavior in the spot
market. We assume a set of actions and beliefs for all agents and explore whether any agent has an incentive
to deviate. This section explores equilibria in which the monopolist hides his futures market participation
by randomizing the order ow he submits. When the monopolist submits a positive (negative) order ow
with plans to drive up (down) spot prices to make this position protable market makers are unsure if
it is the monopolist or other traders (without market power) who are submitting the order. This imperfect
inference allows the monopolist to receive favorable futures market prices, at the expense of other agents in
the market.
In this setting, a subgame perfect equilibrium consists of
1. beliefs held by market makers about Cn and the distribution of ~Cm, and a price schedule, k (:) for
which market makers earn zero expected prots,
2. beliefs held by the monopolist about k (:) and Cn, and a set of possible values for Cm where each yields
the same expected prot given those beliefs, and no other values for Cm yield higher expected prots,
3. beliefs held by the risk-averse agents about k (:) and the distribution of ~Cm, and a value of Cn that
maximizes expected utility given those beliefs, and
4. o¤-equilibrium-path beliefs held by market makers about the monopolists order ow when the observed
aggregate order ow is inconsistent with their beliefs given prices set competitively based on these
beliefs, the monopolist will not choose to submit an o¤-equilibrium-path order ow quantity.
Here, the beliefs of all agents must be consistent with one another, and with the actions of other agents.
3.2 Beliefs and Prices of Market Makers
There are many sets of beliefs that market maker could hold about the monopolists futures market partic-
ipation that imply that the monopolists order ow cannot be perfectly inferred from the aggregate order
ow. Here, we look for an equilibrium involving the simplest set of such beliefs. Suppose market makers
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believe that each risk-averse agent submits an order Cn and that the monopolist randomizes between +x
and  x with equal probability where 0  x < 12Cn. Based on their beliefs, they set actuarially fair prices.
O¤-equilibrium-path, we assume that market makers set prices based on the most punitive beliefs.
The aggregate order ow,   Cm + CnN , can indicate that the monopolist has successfully hidden,
that he has been caught for sure with +x or  x given market maker beliefs, or that aggregate order ow
is inconsistent with market makersbeliefs. We categorize the aggregate order ow into the following ve
groups and specify the price schedules for all possible values of .10
A1: k() =
1
2
E [a] +
1
2
b if  > x+ Cn (13)
A2: k() =
1
2
E [a] +
1
2
bx if   x+ Cn <   x+ Cn
A3: k() =
1
2
E [a] if x     x+ Cn
A4: k() =
1
2
E [a]  1
2
bx if   x   < x
A5: k() =
1
2
E [a] +
1
2
b (   Cn) if  <  x
In ranges A1 and A5, market makers know that the monopolist submitted an order ow inconsistent
with market makersexpectations. In range A1, it must have been the case that Cm > x, and they assume
that N = 0. In range A5, it must have been the case that Cm <  x, and they assume N = 1. Prices
are set accordingly. In ranges A2 and A4, market makers believe that the monopolist submitted +x and
 x , respectively. Prices are set accordingly. In range A3, the monopolist hides successfully within the
aggregate order ow. In this region, market makers believe that  x and +x are equally likely.
Prices are set competitively. In other words, if the monopolist and risk-averse agents take actions that
conform to the beliefs of market makers, then no market maker will have an incentive to deviate. Note
that this equilibrium behavior on the part of market makers takes as given the order ow of each risk-averse
agent, Cn. Next, we examine optimal behavior on the part of the monopolist given the beliefs and price
schedule of market makers.
10 If x = 0, prices are set as:
A1: k() =
1
2
E [a] +
1
2
b () if  > Cn
A3: k() =
1
2
E [a] if 0    Cn
A5: k() =
1
2
E [a] +
1
2
b (   Cn) if  < 0
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3.3 Beliefs and Actions of Monopolist
The monopolist takes as given the order ow of risk-averse agents, Cn, as well as the futures price schedule,
k (), set by market makers given the aggregate order ow. As shown in Proposition 1, in any equilibrium
in which the risk-neutral monopolist does not try to disguise his order ow he will not participate in the
futures market. In this case, his expected prots are
E [jCm = 0] = 1
4b
E

a2

.
On the other hand, if the monopolist nds it optimal to randomize in a way consistent with market makers
beliefs, he must earn the same expected prots whether he submits an order ow +x or  x. Otherwise,
he would only play one of the strategies and his actions would be incompatible with market makersbeliefs.
Given the futures price schedule, k (:), we now nd the optimal behavior on the part of the monopolist.
Proposition 6 Given that market makers set k (:) as in (13), the monopolist will maximize expected prots
by submitting either Cm = +x or  x, where 0  x < 14Cn. The monopolists expected prots will be
E [jx] = E [j   x] = 1
4b
E

a2

+
1
4
bx2   b
Cn
x3
> E [jCm = 0] for x > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
When market makers set k (:) consistent with the belief that the monopolist randomizes between +x,
and  x, the monopolist will nd it optimal to act consistently with those beliefs. Note that there are many
possible equilibria, one for each x. In an equilibrium in which x = 0, the monopolist does not participate in
the futures market. For larger x, the monopolist prots in the futures market at the expense of risk-averse
agents.
3.3.1 Beliefs and Actions of Risk-Averse Agents
The risk-averse agents know that it is optimal for the monopolist to hide within the aggregate order ow
by randomizing Cm. The monopolist will then set spot market prices optimally given his futures position,
thereby increasing expected prots. Risk-averse agents are risk-averse in the domain of their prots, n =
n (P ). Their preferences are represented by a concave utility function, u. To reduce their exposure to
spot market price risk, a given risk-averse agent will participate in the futures market by purchasing C units
of the futures contract. Cn is the number of contracts purchased by the average risk-averse agent in the
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market. C is then set optimally by each agent according to the following optimization problem:
Cn = argmax
C
E [u (C (P   k) + n (P ))] .
Note that any given risk-averse agent is too small to a¤ect aggregate order-ow and thus takes prices as
given. We assume that prots are linear in the spot market price, i.e. n (P ) = c0 + c1P , with c1 < 0, so
that higher spot prices imply lower prots. This implies that
Cn = argmax
C
E [u (C (P    k) + c0 + c1P )] (14)
= argmax
C
E

u

C

1
2
(a+ bCm)  k

+ c0 + c1

1
2
(a+ bCm)

where k (:) is set consistent with (13). As before, risk-averse agents believe that Cm can take on two values,
+x and  x, with equal probability. We have shown above that for a given Cn there exist equilibria with
0  x < 14Cn.
When a risk-averse agent wants to hedge, this provides him with information that the expected aggregate
hedging demand is high. He then acts rationally taking this information into account. Since risk-averse agents
are identical, none is more or less likely to hedge than any other. Therefore, the distribution of the number
of hedgers, conditional on a given agent wanting to hedge, is f (N) = 2N .11
First, we examine optimal hedging in the absence of the monopolist, i.e. if x = 0. In this case,
Cn = argmax
C
E

u

C

1
2
a  1
2
E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2
a

.
The FOC is then
E

1
2
a  1
2
E [a]

u0

C

1
2
a  1
2
E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2
a

= 0.
Note that the SOC is satised. For Cn =  c1, the FOC is satised and it is a global maximum. Without
the monopolists participation in the futures market, it is optimal for risk-averse agents to eliminate all risk.
We now examine optimal hedging when the monopolist participates in the futures market, i.e. when x > 0.
Proposition 7 In an equilibrium in which the monopolist participates in the futures market with order ow
+x and  x with equal probability where 0 < x < 14Cn, risk-averse agents maximizing (14) will participate
in the futures market, though will participate less than they would if the monopolist did not participate, i.e.
11Similarly, agents without hedging needs would update their beliefs about the expected number of hedgers accordingly.
These agents will participate in the futures market to exploit their information. This will mitigate but not eliminate the e¤ect
we discuss. If all agents do not take into account the information contained in their own hedging demand, these agents will not
believe that they face unfavorable prices on average, and will not reduce their hedging demand. However, their expected prots
will be lower if they hold these naïve beliefs.
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0 < Cn <  c1.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
If risk-averse agents believe that the monopolist trades strategically in the futures market, they are
concerned that the monopolist will hold an opposite position and move spot prices against them. A given
risk-averse agent knows that he is more likely to want to hedge precisely at the wrong times as he is more
likely to hedge when aggregate order ow from risk-averse agents is large. In this case, either the monopolist
also submits a large order ow and is spotted in which case futures prices are set fairly or the monopolist
submits a small order ow and hides successfully  in which case the monopolist gains at the risk-averse
agentsexpense. This makes hedging more expensive for agents without market power and thus discourages
their participation in the futures market.
The following proposition shows that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists with the beliefs and actions
as specied above.
Proposition 8 Given the market structure described in Subsection 3.1, there exists a subgame perfect equi-
librium in which futures market prices are set as in (13), risk-averse agents each submit an order of Cn,
where 0 < Cn <  c1, and the monopolist submits an order ow of either +x or  x with equal probability,
where 0 < x < 14C
n.
Proof. Proposition 6 shows that the monopolist has no incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. Proposi-
tion 7 shows that risk-averse agents have no incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. Market makers earn
zero prots and none has an incentive to o¤er another price schedule.
Here, a spot market monopolist is able to increase prots by trading strategically in the futures market.
The monopolist takes a futures market position randomly, then deviates from the spot market monopoly
optimum to move spot market prices and make this position more protable. If the monopolists futures
market position were perfectly observable, market makers would set futures market prices anticipating these
actions. In this case, the monopolist would not want to participate in the futures market since doing so
would decrease expected spot market prots without increasing expected futures market prots. However,
when there are other traders in the market, the futures market position submitted by the monopolist cannot
be perfectly inferred by observing the aggregate order ow. In this case, market makers set prices based
on the rational belief that the orders they receive could have come from either the monopolist or from other
agents without market power. As a result, trades submitted by the monopolist move prices less than they
would had they been observable. Just as an informed trader in the Kyle model prots at the expense of
noise traders, the monopolist earns positive expected prots in the futures market at the expense of the
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other market participants. This makes futures market participation expensive, and reduces the optimal
hedging of risk-averse agents.
4 Futures Market Manipulation under Spot Market Power
The last section showed that a spot market monopolist can protably exploit spot market power in the
futures market. This section documents that even those without market power can prot in the futures
market when another agent has spot market power. This section relies on the insight of Kumar and Seppi
(1992), that agents without inside information can manipulate a market if they are mistaken for agents with
inside information. Here, we show that the same can be said of market power: agents without market power
who hold futures market positions can use later trading to manipulate prices to make the original position
protable when market makers believe they might have market power.
4.1 Model Setup with Manipulators
4.1.1 Timing and Markets
While the models developed earlier in this paper have markets in only two periods, this model requires trade
in three periods. The last two periods mirror our earlier setup. In this section, we add an initial period in
which agents trade contracts whose payo¤s are contingent on futures prices in the next period. Presenting
the markets in reverse chronological order:
t = 2 : There is a spot market at time t = 2. Production in this period is controlled by a monopolist, who
faces a linear demand curve, i.e. spot prices are given by (7), P = a  bQ, where a, b > 0.12 The cost
of production is zero.
t = 1 : There is a futures market at time t = 1, characterized by linear cash-settled contracts based on the
spot price in the next period, with payo¤ P   k1 per contract.
t = 0 : There is a futures market at time t = 0, characterized by linear cash-settled contracts based on the
futures strike price in the next period, with payo¤ k1   k0 per contract.13
12While the assumption of linear demand is critical to obtain simple analytic results, the same intuition obtains with a convex
demand curve. While losing analytic tractability, these demand functions have the advantage that the monopolist has a strict
benet from participating in the futures market. When demand is linear, the increased prots in the futures market that come
with futures market participation are exactly o¤set by lower spot market monopoly prots.
13Note that a futures contract whose payo¤ is based on the price of another futures contract is unusual. However, there
are many options whose payo¤ is based on a futures contract. While we use a linear futures contract and not an options
contract at t = 0 for analytical tractability, our result that manipulative trading exists in equilibrium is robust to changes in
the contractual structure. Furthermore, many futures markets based on the spot price of a storable commodity are e¤ectively
a future on a future, as storability links current spot and forward prices.
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Figure 2
4.1.2 Actors
The model involves four types of actors:
1. Noise traders submit a stochastic order ow, Cn0 , at t = 0 and they do not participate at t = 1. We
assume that Cn0 is uniformly distributed on [C
n ; Cn+]. The assumption that noise traders participate
only in the initial period is for expositional simplicity and is not necessary to obtain these results.14
2. Monopolist submits an order ow, Cm1 , at t = 1, and then sets prices and quantities optimally at t = 2.
To simplify the problem, the monopolist is assumed not to participate in the futures market at t = 0:
3. Manipulator (denoted by the letter h to refer to hiders) submit an order ow, Ch0 , at t = 0, and C
h
1 ,
at t = 1. We impose the following liquidity constraint
Ch0  W < 12 (Cn+   Cn ).15
4. Market makers, as before, are risk-neutral and act competitively to set strike prices k0 and k1. Market
makers observe aggregate order ow 1  Cm1 + Ch1 at t = 1 and 0  Ch0 + Cn0 at t = 0, and
make rational inferences about the positions of various agents and their impact on contract payo¤s.
Therefore, k1 = E [P j1] and k0 = E [k1j0].
Figure 2 provides a timeline showing which agents participate in each market.
The monopolist is willing to participate in the futures market for the same strategic reason outlined in
Section 3. He earns prots by setting spot market prices to make his futures market position protable.
While the monopolists spot market prot at t = 2 is lower than it would be had he not participated in the
futures market, futures market prots in t = 1 are high enough (at least weakly) to o¤set these reduced
prots.
14Note that, for simplicity, we assume in this section that noise traders act mechanically as they do in the Kyle model.
Introducing optimal behavior on their part as in Section 3 would not change our result that manipulative trading is possible in
equilibrium.
15We impose this wealth constraint as the manipulator will nd it optimal to take an unbounded position otherwise.
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The manipulator is willing to accept expected losses in the futures market at t = 1 for the same reason
that the monopolist is willing to accept lower expected prots in the spot market at t = 2: Just as the
monopolist sets spot prices at t = 2 to make his futures market position at t = 1 protable, the manipulator
trades in the futures market at t = 1 in order to move futures prices, thereby making his futures market
position at t = 0 protable. Just as the monopolist earns expected prots at the expense of the manipulator
at t = 1, the manipulator earns expected prots at the expense of noise traders at t = 0.
4.1.3 Spot Market Prices
For a given futures market position, the monopolists prot is
 = Cm1 (P   k1) + PQ
= Cm1 (a  bQ  k1) + (a  bQ)Q.
Note that prices and quantities are optimally set at
Q =
1
2b
(a  bCm1 ) and
P  =
1
2
(a+ bCm1 ) ,
so that optimal prot will be
 =  Cm1 k1 +
1
4b
(a+ bCm1 )
2
:
As in Section 3, futures market participation causes the monopolist to deviate from the spot market monopoly
optimum. He moves prices to make the futures market position protable.
4.2 Equilibrium with Manipulation
Here, we propose an equilibrium with manipulation:
At t = 0, the manipulator randomizes between +x and  x with equal probability where
x = min
 
W; 23 (C
n+   Cn   W ). Note that W is the liquidity constraint faced by the manipulator, the
maximum order ow in absolute value that the manipulator can submit. Cn+ and Cn  are the maximum
and minimum order ows that could be submitted by the noise traders. Market makers set
k0 =
1
2
a
regardless of the aggregate order ow submitted.
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At t = 1, the equilibrium will take three di¤erent forms depending on aggregate order ow 0 = Ch0 +C
n
0
at t = 0. If 0 > Cn+   x then market makers know that the manipulator must have submitted Ch0 = +x.
In this case, the monopolist will not participate in the futures market, i.e. Cm1 = 0. The manipulator submits
the same order as in the previous period, i.e. Ch1 = C
h
0 , and market makers set the futures price as
k1 = E [P
j1] = 1
2
a+
1
2
b (1   x) .
If Cn  + x  0  Cn+   x then the manipulator has successfully hidden his order ow in the previous
period. The monopolist randomizes over Cm1 2
  12x; 12x	 with equal probability, and the manipulator sets
Ch1 =
1
2C
h
0 . Market makers set the futures price as
k1 = E [P
j1] = 1
2
a+
1
4
b1.
If 0 < Cn  + x then market makers know that the manipulator must have submitted Ch0 =  x. The
monopolist will not participate, i.e. Cm1 = 0, and the manipulator submits the same order as in the previous
period, i.e. Ch1 = C
h
0 . The futures price is then set as
k1 = E [P
j1] = 1
2
a+
1
2
b (1 + x) :
At t = 2 monopolists sets P  = 12 (a+ bC
m
1 ) and Q
 = 12b (a  bCm1 ).
Proposition 9 The actions and beliefs described above constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Financial market manipulation is possible when agents without market power can be mistaken for those
with market power. An agent without market power can prot by taking a random position in the initial
futures market at t = 0. When this random position is not spotted, he has an incentive to move subsequent
futures prices at t = 1 to make this initial position more protable. For example, if he takes a long position
in the initial futures market, this position becomes protable if subsequent futures market prices are high.
As a result, he has an incentive to take a long position in the subsequent futures market to drive up prices.
When market makers observe this long position, they believe it could have been submitted by the monopolist,
who would then use his monopoly power to raise spot prices. Therefore, market makers rationally set higher
futures prices in response to the long aggregate order ow they observe. Since the manipulators trade at
t = 1 moves prices without altering the underlying contract payo¤, this trade is unprotable. By taking
a larger position in the initial futures market than in the subsequent one, the prots he earns in the initial
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futures market by moving subsequent prices exceed his losses from subsequent trading.
In Section 3, a monopolists trades could not be di¤erentiated from those submitted by risk-averse agents.
He was able to prot because the futures market trades he submitted moved prices by less than they would
have had they been observable. In this section, a manipulators trades cannot be di¤erentiated from those
of the monopolist. The manipulator is able to prot because the futures market trades he submits move
prices by more than they would have had they been observable. As in Section 3, the monopolist prots
from the manipulators presence at t = 1 since this causes the trades he submits to move prices by less than
they would otherwise.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how spot market power impacts three rationales for trading in futures contracts.
First, agents with and without spot market power will participate in futures market to hedge their risk.
Second, agents with spot market power trade in the futures market and then strategically set spot prices to
make their futures position more protable. Last, agents without market power may manipulate futures
prices to make their earlier futures market positions protable. In a rational expectations equilibrium, these
three motives provide a reason for futures markets to exist even if the underlying spot market is monopolistic.
When futures market positions can be perfectly inferred by market participants, trades will only take
place to satisfy hedging needs. If, however, the futures market positions of individual agents are not perfectly
observable, strategic and manipulative motives for trade are also possible. In the case of strategic trading, the
monopolist prots by hiding behind the trades of agents without market power. In the case of manipulation,
agents without market power prot from hiding behind the trades of the monopolist.
Rational market makers set futures prices taking into account the moral hazard problem created by
the monopolists adjustment of spot market prices given his futures market position. This makes hedging
expensive, and therefore reduces futures market participation for agents with and without market power.
We have shown this makes it impossible for the monopolist to eliminate all risk.
Many existing futures market whose underlying spot markets are imperfectly competitive exhibit very low
participation relative to the importance of those markets. In particular, markets for longer term contracts
are very illiquid. Given the moral hazard problems discussed in this paper, several markets  including
weather and insurance derivatives have emerged to avoid the ine¢ ciencies caused by market power. The
trading activity in futures markets on oil, for example, is very low. Our paper suggests that this can be
explained by the imperfectly competitive structure of the oil spot market. Weather derivatives provide an
index-hedge against extreme temperatures, and therefore against oil demand risk. However, these contracts
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are not susceptible to the moral hazard issue discussed in this paper and thus improve market e¢ ciency.
The market for insurance derivatives (e.g. catastrophe bonds) o¤ers investors the opportunity to trade on
the impact of natural catastrophes. One common feature that almost all insurance derivatives share is the
inclusion of an index trigger that, for example, relates to the strength of a hurricane or an industry index
of insured property losses. These triggers contrast to indemnity triggers which are based on the size of an
insurers loss which are prone to moral hazard. For example, the issuing insurance company could change
the prole of risks it underwrites or its claim-settlement process. While these index-related contracts solve
the moral hazard problem, they introduce basis risk, the potential mismatch between the underlying risk
and the payo¤ of these index contracts.16
16Doherty and Richter (2002) show that it is optimal to supplement an index hedge by gap insurance which provides
insurance against basis risk.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Risk neutrality implies that u0 () is constant. The rst derivative of expected utility with respect to the
number of derivatives contracts can be written as
@E [u ()]
@C
= E

g   E [g]  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

 u0 ()

= u0 ()E

g   E [g]  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

Di¤erentiation the FOC for the last period
(Cg0 +Q) f1 + f = 0
with respect to C yields
0 =

g0 + C
dQ
dC
f1g
00 + 2
dQ
dC

f1 + (Cg
0 +Q)
dQ
dC
f11 = 0;
dQ
dC
=   g
0f1
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
.
@E[u()]
@C can then be rewritten as
@E [u ()]
@C
= u0 ()CE
"
(g0f1)
2
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
#
.
For C = 0, the FOC is satised. The SOC in the last period,
(Cf1g
00 + 2) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11 < 0,
implies that
(g0f1)
2
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
< 0.
Therefore @E[u()]@C > 0 for all C < 0; and
@E[u()]
@C < 0 for all C > 0. We conclude that C
 = 0 is a global
maximum.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof, we assume without loss of generality that E [g (D)] = 0. Prots are then given by  =
g (D) +QP . The FOC in the nal period is
@
@Q
= Qf1 + f = 0.
Note, that this FOC is identical to the one without futures market participation. The monopolist therefore
maintains full market power in the spot market. The FOC determines an optimal quantity, Q (D), and a
price, f (Q (D) ; D). Assume the monopolist designs a futures contract with the following payo¤
g (D) = E [Q (D) f (Q (D) ; D)] Q (D) f (Q (D) ; D) .
In this case, prots are constant and risk is eliminated completely. Note, that any perturbation to g reduces
expected utility for the risk-averse monopolist.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The FOC in the initial period is
@E [u ()]
@C
= E

g   E [g]  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

 u0 ()

= 0.
The rst derivative of expected utility evaluated at C = 0 is given by
@E [u ()]
@C
jC=0 = E [(g   E [g])  u0 (QP )]
= Cov (g; u0 (QP )) .
Here, we make an assumption about the nature of demand shocks. In particular, we assume that a shock to
demand that increases equilibrium prices will at least weakly increase equilibrium quantities. Put another
way, any demand shock that increases prices will increase monopoly prots. Formally, for any demand shock
such that
@f (Q;D)
@D
= f1
@Q
@D
+ f2 > 0
we have
@Q
@D
 0.
This implies that
@
@D
=
@Q
@D
f +Q

f1
@Q
@D
+ f2

> 0.
In this case, a shock to demand has the following impact on marginal utility
@u0 (QP )
@D
=

@Q
@D
f +Q

f1
@Q
@D
+ f2

 u00 (QP ) < 0.
The impact on the payo¤ of the derivatives contract is
@g (P )
@D
=

@Q
@D
f1 + f2

g0.
Therefore, if the payo¤ of the derivatives contract is increasing in the spot price then Cov (g; u0 (QP )) < 0.
This yields @E[u()]@C jC=0 < 0, which implies that C < 0. It is thus optimal for the monopolist to sell
derivatives contracts. The e¤ect on quantity is
@Q
@C
=   g
0f1
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
< 0
and the e¤ect on spot prices is
@f
@C
=   g
0 (f1)
2
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
> 0.
Note that the spot market SOC implies that the denominators in both fractions are negative. He thus
increases quantity and sells at a lower price as C < 0. The derivative of expected prots with respect to
C is
E

@
@C

=  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

.
In the situation above, we get E

@
@C

> 0 for all C < 0. This implies that the monopolists expected prots
when optimally participating in the derivatives market with C < 0 are lower than if he did not participate.
If the payo¤ of the derivatives contract is decreasing in the spot price then Cov (g; u0 (QP )) > 0. This
yields @E[u()]@C jC=0 > 0, which implies that C > 0. It is thus optimal for the monopolist to buy strictly
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positive number of derivatives contracts. The e¤ect on quantity is
@Q
@C
=   g
0f1
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
> 0
and the e¤ect on spot prices is
@f
@C
=   g
0 (f1)
2
(2 + Cf1g00) f1 + (Cg0 +Q) f11
< 0.
Again, the monopolist increases quantity and sells at a lower price. In this case, E

@
@C

< 0 for all C > 0.
This implies that the monopolists expected prots when optimally participating in the derivatives market
with C > 0 are lower than if he did not participate.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
In this proof, we assume that the payo¤ of the derivatives contract is increasing in the spot price.17 Here, we
compare two potential monopolists with utility functions u and v. If the monopolist with utility function v
is more risk averse than the one with u, then there exist an increasing, concave function h such that v = hu.
Let Cu denote the optimal number of derivatives contracts bought by monopolist u. In this case, Cu
satises the FOC
@E [u ( (C))]
@C
jC=Cu = 0. (15)
The rst derivative of expected utility of monopolist v with respect to C evaluated at Cu is
@E [v ( (C))]
@C
jC=Cu = E

v0 ( (Cu))
@ (Cu)
@C

= E

h0 (u ( (Cu)))u0 ( (Cu))
@ (Cu)
@C

.
Recall that
@
dC
=

g   E [g]  CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

; (16)
and let
P  E [g] + CE

dQ
dC
f1g
0

. (17)
Note that @dC > 0 i¤ g <
P . Recall that by assumption
@f
@D
> 0 and (18)
@Q
@D
 0,
which implies
@
@D
> 0. (19)
We have @g(P )@D =
@f
@Dg
0 > 0. Let D be a level of demand for which g
 
f
 
Q
 
D

; D

= P . As g is increasing
in the level of demand, there can be at most one such point. If @dC could be either positive or negative, such
a point exists. If @dC never switches sign, set
D = 0 or 1. Together,
g (f (Q (D) ; D)) < P i¤D < D:
17The proof for a contract whose payo¤ is decreasing in the spot price is equivalent.
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Therefore,
D < D i¤
@
dC
> 0. (20)
In this case, we can split @E[v((C;D))]@C into two parts,
@E [v ( (C))]
@C
=
Z D
D=0

h0 (u ( (C;D)))u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

dD
+
Z 1
D= D

h0 (u ( (C;D)))u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

dD.
(19) implies that
@h0 (u ( (C;D)))
@D
= h00 (u ( (C;D)))u0 ( (C;D))
@
@D
< 0,
and therefore
h0
 
u
 

 
C; D

< h0 (u ( (Q0; D))) i¤D < D. (21)
This means that
@E [v ( (C))]
@C
=
Z D
D=0

h0 (u ( (C;D)))u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

dD
+
Z 1
D= D

h0 (u ( (C;D)))u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

dD
> g0 (u ( (C;D)))
Z D
D=0

u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

dD
+g0 (u ( (C;D)))
Z 1
D= D

u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

dD.
The last inequality follows from (21) and (20). Rejoining the two parts of the integral,
@E [v ( (C))]
@C
> g0 (u ( (C;D)))E

u0 ( (C;D))
@ (C;D)
@C

.
(15) implies that @E[v((C))]@C jC=Cu > 0. Therefore, at the optimal number of derivatives contracts for
monopolist u, expected utility of monopolist v could be increased by increasing C. If expected utility is
concave, namely if @
2E[v((C))]
@C2 < 0, then C
v > Cu.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Let g (P ) be the payo¤ of a price-contingent derivatives contract to the monopolist and let Q (P;D) be the
inverse demand function. Suppose demand D is indexed such that Q (P;Di) < Q (P;Dj) if and only if
Di < Dj and P > 0. For a demand realization Di prots are given by
 (Di) = g (P ) +Q (P;Di)P .
Suppose there exists a price-contingent contract g (P ) that eliminates all risk and whose price is set compet-
itively. Then the monopolist sets prices optimally contingent on realized demand. Therefore, for any two
demand realization Di and Dj
g (P (Di)) +Q (P (Di) ; Di)P (Di) = g (P (Dj)) +Q (P (Dj) ; Dj)P (Dj) . (22)
The contract must be incentive compatible in the sense that
g (P (Dj)) +Q (P (Dj) ; Dj)P (Dj)  g (P (Di)) +Q (P (Di) ; Dj)P (Di) (23)
28
for all Di and Dj . Now, assume that Dj is the realized level of demand but that the monopolist set prices
equal to P (Di) for some Di < Dj . Prots are then
 = g (P (Di)) +Q (P (Di) ; Dj)P (Di) .
Since Q (P (Di) ; Di) < Q (P (Di) ; Dj)
g (P (Di)) +Q (P (Di) ; Dj)P (Di) > g (P (Di)) +Q (P (Di) ; Di)P (Di) .
(22) then implies
g (P (Di)) +Q (P (Di) ; Dj)P (Di) > g (P (Dj)) +Q (P (Dj) ; Dj)P (Dj) .
This violates the incentive compatibility constraint (23) as the monopolist gets a higher prot by pretending
to be in demand state Di when realized demand is Dj . Therefore, no derivatives contracts exists that
eliminates all risk.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
In this case, when submitting Cm, there are 7 ranges the monopolists order ow, Cm, could be in. These
are categorized according to which possible prices, A1 A5, the monopolist could face, depending upon the
realization of N :
M1 Cm > x+ Cn always A1 caught up o¤-equilibrium
E [jCm] =  CmE [kjCm] + 1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
E [jCm] =  Cm
Z 1
0

1
2
E [a] +
1
2
b (Cm + CnN)

dN +
1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
=
1
4b
E

a2
  1
2
bCm

1
2
Cm +
1
2
Cn

< E [j0] = 1
4b
E

a2

if Cn >  Cm
M2  x+ Cn < Cm  x+ Cn either A1 caught up o¤-equilibriumor A2 caught up on-equilibrium
(a) A1 if Cn + x  Cm < CnN  Cn
(b) A2 if 0  CnN  Cn + x  Cm
E [jCm] =  CmE [kjCm] + 1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
E [jCm] =  Cm 1
2
E [a]  Cm
Z 1
1+ x C
m
Cn
1
2
b (Cm + CnN) dN   Cm
Z 1+ x CmCn
0
1
2
bxdN +
1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
=
1
4b
E

a2
  1
4
bCm
 
Cm +
(x  Cm)2
Cn
!
< E [j0] = 1
4b
E

a2

if Cm > 0
M3 x < Cm   x + Cn either A1 caught up o¤-equilibrium, A2 caught up on-equilibrium, or A3
hidden
(a) A1 if Cn + x  Cm < CnN  Cn
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(b) A2 if Cn   x  Cm  CnN  Cn + x  Cm
(c) A3 if 0  CnN  Cn   x  Cm
E [jCm] =  CmE [kjCm] + 1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
E [jCm] =  Cm 1
2
E [a]  Cm
Z 1
1+ x C
m
Cn
1
2
b (Cm + CnN) dN   Cm
Z 1+ x CmCn
1  x+CmCn
1
2
bxdN +
1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
=
1
4b
E

a2
  1
2
bCm

1
2
Cm   1
2
x2   Cm2
Cn
  x+ 2 x
2
Cn

dE [jCm]
dCm
=  1
2
b

Cm   x+ 3
2
x2
Cn
+
3
2
Cm2
Cn

d
dCm
E [jx < Cm   x+ Cn] < 0 8 Cm > x
M4  x  Cm  x eitherA2 caught up on-equilibrium, A3 hidden, orA4 caught down on-equilibrium
(a) A2 if Cn   x  Cm  CnN  Cn
(b) A3 if x  Cm  CnN  Cn   x  Cm
(c) A4 if 0  CnN < x  Cm
E [jCm] =  Cm 1
2
E [a]  Cm
Z 1
1  x+CmCn
1
2
bxdN + Cm
Z x Cm
Cn
0
1
2
bxdN +
1
4b
E
h
(a+ bCm)
2
i
=
1
4b
E

a2

+ bCm2

1
4
  1
Cn
x

For 0 < x < 14C
n as in the proposed equilibrium  E [jCm] is maximized at Cm = x and Cm =  x:
M5 x   Cn  Cm <  x either A3 hidden, A4 caught down on-equilibrium, or A5 caught down
o¤-equilibrium
(a) A3 if x  Cm  CnN  Cn
(b) A4 if  x  Cm  CnN < x  Cm
(c) A5 if 0  CnN <  x  Cm
By analogy to M3, ddCmE [jx  Cn  Cm <  x] > 0
M6  x Cn  Cm < x Cn either A4 caught down on-equilibriumor A5 caught down o¤-equilibrium
(a) A4 if  x  Cm  CnN < Cn
(b) A5 if 0  CnN < 0  x  Cm
By analogy to M2, E [j   x  Cn  Cm < x  Cn] < E [j0]
M7 Cm <  x  Cn always A5 caught up o¤-equilibrium
By analogy to M1,E [jCm <  x  Cn] < E [j0].
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Given the values of E [jCm] given above, E [] is maximized for Cm = x and Cm =  x for 0 < x < 14Cn,
so that
E [jx] = E [j   x] = 1
4b
E

a2

+
1
4
bx2   b
Cn
x3 > E [j0] .
Therefore, the monopolist is indi¤erent between submitting Cm = x and Cm =  x, and the market makers
can rationally believe that the monopolist randomizes between these two values with equal probability.
Given these beliefs, prices are set competitively and no market maker has an incentive to change k.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Risk-averse agents maximize the following objective function:
Cn = argmax
C
E [u (C (P    k) + c0 + c1P )]
= argmax
C
E

u

C

1
2
(a+ bCm)  k

+ c0 + c1
1
2
(a+ bCm)

where the risk averse agent takes as given the order ow submitted by the average risk-averse agent, Cn,
and by the monopolist, Cm. The rst and second derivative of expected utility are given by
@Eu
@C
= E

1
2
(a+ bCm)  k

u0

C

1
2
(a+ bCm)  k

+ c0 + c1
1
2
(a+ bCm)

@2Eu
@C2
= E
"
1
2
(a+ bCm)  k
2
u00

C

1
2
(a+ bCm)  k

+ c0 + c1
1
2
(a+ bCm)
#
< 0.
Expected utility of risk averse agents is therefore a concave function in C.
@Eu
@C
=

1
2
R
E
 
1
2 (a+ bx)  k (x+NCn)

u0
 
C
 
1
2 (a+ bx)  k (x+NCn)

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a+ bx)

2NdN
+ 12
R
E
 
1
2 (a  bx)  k ( x+NCn)

u0
 
C
 
1
2 (a  bx)  k ( x+NCn)

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a  bx)

2NdN

=
266664
1
2

1   1  2xCn 2E   12 (a+ bx)  12E [a]  12bxu0  C   12 (a+ bx)  12E [a]  12bx+ c0 + c1 12 (a+ bx)
+ 12
 
1  2xCn
2
E
 
1
2 (a+ bx)  12E [a]

u0
 
C
 
1
2 (a+ bx)  12E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a+ bx)

+ 12

1    2xCn 2E   12 (a  bx)  12E [a]u0  C   12 (a  bx)  12E [a]+ c0 + c1 12 (a  bx)
+ 12
 
2x
Cn
2
E
 
1
2 (a  bx)  12E [a] + 12bx

u0
 
C
 
1
2 (a  bx)  12E [a] + 12bx

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a  bx)

377775
If we set x = Cn for 0 <  < 14 and C = C
n, we can dene the function g (:) such that
g (C)  @Eu
@C
jCn=C
=
266664
1
2

1  (1  2)2

E
 
1
2a  12E [a]

u0
 
C
 
1
2a  12E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a+ bC)

+ 12 (1  2)2E
 
1
2 (a+ bC)  12E [a]

u0
 
C
 
1
2 (a+ bC)  12E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a+ bC)

+ 12

1  (2)2

E
 
1
2 (a  bC)  12E [a]

u0
 
C
 
1
2 (a  bC)  12E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a  bC)

+ 12 (2)
2
E
 
1
2a  12E [a]

u0
 
C
 
1
2a  12E [a]

+ c0 + c1
1
2 (a  bC)

377775
First, we evaluate g (0)
g (0) = E

1
2
a  1
2
E [a]

u0

c0 + c1
1
2
a

Note that this expression is positive as c1 < 0. As a result, when other risk-averse agents do not hedge,
any given risk-averse agent can increase utility by hedging. Therefore, there is no equilibrium in which
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no hedging occurs unless c1 = 0, in which case the agents have no incentive to hedge. Next, we evaluate
g ( c1). In this case, we get
g ( c1) = 2u0

c1
1
2
E [a] + c0

1
2
bc1 (1  2)
< 0 for c1 < 0.
As expected, g ( c1) < 0.
This means that g switches signs between C = 0 and C =  c1. Furthermore, g is a smooth function.
Therefore, there must exist a C between zero and  c1 such that g (C) = 0. As shown above, expected
utility is a concave function in the amount of hedging, C, which implies that the rst derivative of expected
utility, g, is decreasing in C. The solution C to g (C) = 0 is therefore unique. Note that this implies
that in the proposed equilibria above there is some hedging by the risk averse agents but hedging is reduced
relative to the case of no monopolist participation in the market.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 9
We rst examine the optimal behavior given the beliefs about the manipulators behavior.
A.8.1 Monopolist
We showed that at t = 2 the monopolist maximizes his prots by setting price and quantity as P  =
1
2 (a+ bC
m
1 ) and Q
 = 12b (a  bCm1 ). At t = 1, the monopolist maximizes expected prots given the price
schedule he faces and the beliefs he holds about the manipulators trading behavior. His objective function
at t = 1 depends on the aggregate order ow 0 = Ch0 + C
n
0 at t = 0.
If 0 > Cn+   x then his expected prots are
E [] = E

 Cm1

1
2
a+
1
2
b
 
Cm1 + C
h
1   x

+
1
4b
(a+ bCm1 )
2

.
The FOC is
@E []
@Cm1
= E

 1
2
b
 
Ch1   x
  1
2
bCm1

.
Note that given 0 > Cn+ x and the beliefs about the manipulators trade at t = 0 we have Ch1 = x, which
implies Cm1 = 0. The SOC is
@2E []
@Cm21
=  1
2
b < 0.
If Cn  + x  0  Cn+   x then his expected prots are
E [] = E

 Cm1

1
2
a+
1
4
b
 
Cm1 + C
h
1

+
1
4b
(a+ bCm1 )
2

The FOC is
@E []
@Cm1
= E

 1
4
bCh1

.
Note that the monopolist believes that the manipulator will randomize between + 12x and   12x with equal
probability, so that E

Ch1

= 0, and @E[]@Cm1 = 0. Therefore, the monopolist is indi¤erent between submitting
an order ow and therefore willing to submit Cm1 2
  12x; 12x	 with equal probability.18
18Here the monopolist is indi¤erent between participating and not participating in the futures market. This result is obtained
because we make the assumptions that there is no noise trading at t = 1 and demand is linear. If we either allow for noise
trading at t = 1 or a convex demand function the monopolist would have a strict incentive to strategically randomize at t = 1.
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If 0 < Cn  + x then his expected prots are
E [] = E

 Cm1

1
2
a+
1
2
b
 
Cm1 + C
h
1 + x

+
1
4b
(a+ bCm1 )
2

In this case, the FOC is
@E []
@Cm1
= E

 1
2
b
 
Ch1 + x
  1
2
bCm1

.
Note that given 0 < Cn  + x and the beliefs about the manipulators trade at t = 0 we have Ch1 =  x.
This implies
@E []
@Cm1
=  1
2
bCm1 = 0
which implies Cm1 = 0. The SOC is
@2E []
@Cm21
=  1
2
b < 0.
We have thus shown that the monopolist has no incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium given
the price schedule and his beliefs about the manipulators actions. Next, we examine the optimal behavior
of the manipulator.
A.8.2 Manipulator
At t = 1 the manipulator submits an order ow to maximize his expected prots which depend on the
aggregate order ow at t = 0. His expected prots are
E

h

= E

Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

.
If 0 > Cn+   x his expected prots are
E

h

= E

Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

= E

1
2
b
 
Ch1   x
  
Ch0   Ch1

The FOC is
@E

h

@Ch1
= E

1
2
b
 
Ch0   2Ch1

+
1
2
bW

= 0
and the SOC is satised. This implies Ch1 =
1
2
 
x+ Ch0

. Note that if the manipulator does randomize
between +x and  x at t = 0, then 0 > Cn+  x is only true if Ch0 = x. Thus Ch1 = x: His prots are then
E

h

= 0.
If Cn  + x  0  Cn+   x his expected prots are
E

h

= E

Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

= E

1
4
bCh0
 
Cm1 + C
h
1

+
1
4
bCh1
 
Cm1   Ch1

.
The FOC is
@E

h

@Ch1
=
1
4
b
 
Ch0 + E [C
m
1 ]  2Ch1

= 0
and the SOC is satised. This implies Ch1 =
1
2
 
Ch0 + E [C
m
1 ]

. Note that if the manipulator believes that
the monopolist randomizes between + 12x and   12x with equal probability at t = 0, then Ch1 = 12Ch0 . His
prots are then
E

h

=
1
16
bCh20 > 0
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If 0 < Cn  + x his expected prots are
E

h

= E

Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

= E

1
2
b
 
Ch1 + x
  
Ch0   Ch1

.
The FOC is
@E

h

@Ch1
= E

1
2
b
 
Ch0   2Ch1
  1
2
bW

= 0
and the SOC is satised. This implies Ch1 =
1
2
  x+ Ch0 . Again, if the manipulator randomizes between
+x and  x at t = 0, then 0 < Cn  + x is only true if Ch0 =  x. Therefore, Ch1 =  x and his prots are
E

h

= 0.
At t = 0 the manipulator submits an order ow Ch0 to maximize his expected prots given optimal
behavior in subsequent periods. His expected prots are given as
E

h

= E

Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

.
If Ch0  0 then
E

h

=
24 1Cn+ Cn  R Cn+Cn+ x Ch0  Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1) dCn0
+ 1Cn+ Cn 
R Cn+ x Ch0
Cn 
 
Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

dCn0
35
=
1
Cn+   Cn 
1
16
bCh20
 
Cn+   x  Ch0   Cn 

.
The FOC is
@E

h

@Ch0
=
1
Cn+   Cn 
1
16
bCh0
 
2
 
Cn+   Cn   2x  3Ch0  .
If the FOC is satised, then Ch0 =
2
3 (C
n+   Cn    x). Recall the liquidity constraint, Ch0   W <
1
2 (C
n+   Cn ). In an interior equilibrium, x = Ch0 , so that Ch0 = 25 (Cn+   Cn ). The SOC is satised in
this case. Taking the liquidity constraint into account, it is optimal to set Ch0 = min
 
W; 25 (C
n+   Cn ).
If Ch0 < 0 then
E

h

=
24 1Cn+ Cn  R Cn+Cn +x Ch0  Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1) dCn0
+ 1Cn+ Cn 
R Cn +x Ch0
Cn 
 
Ch0 (k1   k0) + Ch1 (P   k1)

dCn0
35
=
1
Cn+   Cn 
1
16
bCh20
 
Cn+   Cn    x+ Ch0

.
The FOC is
@E

h

@Ch0
=
1
Cn+   Cn 
1
16
bCh0
 
2
 
Cn+   Cn   2x+ 3Ch0  .
By logic parallel to the case where Ch0  0, it is optimal to set Ch0 =  min
 
W; 25 (C
n+   Cn ).
For an interior solution, expected prots are
E

hjCh0 = 
2
5
 
Cn+   Cn  = 1
100
b
 
Cn+   Cn 2 > 0;
for a corner solution they are
E

hjCh0 = W

=
1
16
bW 2 > 0.
Note that the expected prots are the same if the manipulator submits +x or  x; so he will be willing to
randomize with equal probability.
34
A.8.3 market makers
Note that prices are set competitively when market makers beliefs are consistent with the actions of the noise
traders, the monopolist, and the manipulator. As a result, no market maker has an incentive to change k.
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